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INTRODUCTION 
 In January 2017, Santa Monica had a problem.  The City found it “extremely 
difficult” to enforce its restrictive laws on short-term residential rentals “without 
the cooperation of internet companies which facilitate both legal and illegal short 
term rentals.”  ER-30.  Santa Monica therefore decided it needed to conscript 
online homesharing platforms like Airbnb and HomeAway (“the Platforms”) into 
its enforcement efforts.  But the City also knew that federal law stood in its 
way:  Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”) provides broad 
immunity to online marketplaces for third-party listings; Section 230 preempts 
local laws seeking to impose liability inconsistent with that broad immunity; and 
the First Amendment protects against content-based restrictions on commercial 
speech.  Despite these high legal hurdles, Santa Monica was determined to find 
some way to compel the Platforms to police third-party listings, even if it meant 
impairing the robust e-commerce marketplace the CDA was intended to promote. 
 So Santa Monica got “creative.”  Kimzey v. Yelp! Inc., 836 F.3d 1263, 1269 
(9th Cir. 2016).  Instead of passing a law directly requiring the Platforms to review, 
monitor, and remove third-party listings, Santa Monica enacted an Ordinance that 
regulates “Booking Transactions” occurring on those websites.  And instead of 
passing a law directly regulating advertising, Santa Monica imposed severe 
penalties to punish hosting platforms if they take fees from “Booking 
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Transactions” for listings not registered with the City, thereby intimidating the 
Platforms into screening their listings before publication.  In practice, this 
Ordinance has exactly the same prohibitory effect on the Platforms’ publishing 
activities as would a law that directly forbade publication of listings for 
unregistered rental units.  The City’s circumvention of Section 230 and the First 
Amendment “pushes the envelope” of “artful” draftsmanship.  Kimzey, 836 F.3d at 
1265–66.   
 Because the Ordinance violates the CDA, the Constitution, and the 
California Coastal Act, the district court erred in denying the Platforms’ request for 
a preliminary injunction:  
 First, the CDA preempts the Ordinance.  Section 230 expressly invalidates 
any local law “inconsistent” with Section 230’s broad protections for online 
publishers of third-party content.  47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3).  As Santa Monica 
conceded, the Platforms cannot process “Booking Transactions” under the 
Ordinance unless they first “determine whether the unit is properly licensed for 
rental,” ER-617:23–25, which requires them to monitor third-party listings.  And 
the record shows that, as a practical matter, the Platforms must remove content if 
the Ordinance takes effect.  Because monitoring and removing content are each 
quintessential publisher functions, the Ordinance falls within the CDA’s immunity 
and preemption provisions.   
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 Further, conflict preemption principles bar the Ordinance because it stands 
as an obstacle to two core goals of the CDA:  promoting the development of e-
commerce and preserving the vibrant free market for the Internet, with minimal 
government regulation.  Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027 (9th Cir. 2003).  The 
existence of platforms like Airbnb and HomeAway—which allow residents to earn 
extra income to make ends meet, while giving visitors lower-cost accommodation 
options—is precisely the kind of innovation the CDA was enacted to foster.  In 
fact, allowing localities to circumvent the CDA by targeting transactions, rather 
than content directly, would put every online marketplace at risk, from established 
sites like eBay to innovative startups.  And Santa Monica’s reading of the CDA 
would allow Craigslist to publish the exact same third-party listing as the 
Platforms, but only Craigslist would escape liability.  This would turn back the 
clock on e-commerce and render the modern Internet unrecognizable.  It “cannot 
be the case that the CDA and its purpose[s] … could be so casually 
eviscerated.”  Kimzey, 836 F.3d at 1269.  
 Second, the Ordinance violates the First Amendment because the Platforms 
cannot discern whether a listing is illegal based on the “face” of the 
advertisement.  Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 968 F.2d 1110, 1118–
19 (11th Cir. 1992).  As a result, the Platforms may need to “remove the listing, 
even if the listing owner has complied with the law.”  ER-505.  “Such a chilling 
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effect would compromise the First Amendment interest in commercial speech by 
depriving protected speech of a legitimate and recognized avenue of access to the 
public.”  Braun, 968 F.2d at 1117 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  It makes no difference that the Ordinance purports to target only 
“conduct,” i.e., booking transactions.  The Ordinance’s severe administrative and 
criminal penalties impose a “financial burden” that “operate[s] as [a] disincentive[] 
to speak.”  Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime Victims 
Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 117 (1991).  The Ordinance is “inconsistent with the First 
Amendment.”  Id. at 115.  
 Third, the California Coastal Act preempts the Ordinance.  The Act’s 
unambiguous goal is to expand public access to the coast.  But the Ordinance does 
exactly the opposite.  Governing statutory authority, binding case law, and 
decisions by the California Coastal Commission—which administers the Act—
make clear that vacation rental bans like Santa Monica’s are inconsistent with the 
Coastal Act.  Moreover, all restrictions on vacation rentals must be considered and 
approved by the Coastal Commission, but Santa Monica never sought the 
Commission’s approval.  The Ordinance is procedurally invalid under the Coastal 
Act, too.   
 The district court erroneously concluded that the Platforms did not establish 
a likelihood of success on any of these claims, and so it went no further.  The other 
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preliminary injunction factors tip sharply in the Platforms’ favor.  If the Ordinance 
is not enjoined, the Platforms will face the immediate threat of prosecution and 
hefty penalties; their consumer goodwill will be damaged; and their constitutional 
rights will be endangered.  In contrast, Santa Monica can (and does) enforce its 
Ordinance directly against non-compliant hosts.  Further, the Platforms help (and 
will continue to help) the City enforce the Ordinance by telling users about Santa 
Monica’s restrictions and requiring users to agree to follow them.  Santa Monica’s 
backdoor effort to coerce the Platforms into policing their websites’ content is 
illegal, harmful, and contrary to the public interest.  The district court’s decision 
should be reversed. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  It denied a 
preliminary injunction on March 9, 2018.   
The Platforms filed timely notices of appeal on March 21, 2018.  ER-13–17.  
This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES  
A. Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the 
Platforms’ preliminary injunction motion because it erred as a matter of law by 
holding that:   
(1) the CDA does not preempt the Ordinance;  
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(2)  the Ordinance does not violate the First Amendment; and  
(3)  the Ordinance does not violate the California Coastal Act.  
B. Whether the Platforms satisfy the remaining factors relevant to entry 
of a preliminary injunction, which the district court did not reach. 
STATUTE 
Section 230 of the CDA (47 U.S.C. § 230) and Santa Monica’s Ordinance 
are attached as addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Airbnb and HomeAway 
Airbnb and HomeAway provide online marketplaces for short-term housing 
accommodations.  Their websites allow people seeking and offering 
accommodations—guests and hosts, respectively—to find each other and enter 
into agreements to book those accommodations.  ER-390; ER-501.  Neither 
Airbnb nor HomeAway manages, operates, leases, or owns any properties listed 
on their sites, nor are they parties to agreements between guests and hosts.  ER-
391; ER-501.  Hosts—not the Platforms—provide the content for their listings, 
such as description, price, and availability, and hosts agree they are “responsible 
for their Listings and Host Services.”  ER-391, ER-402; see ER-503–04, ER-524.  
The Platforms are compensated for their publication and related services in 
different ways.  Airbnb provides payment processing services that permit hosts to 
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receive payments electronically.  ER-390.  It receives a fee from the guest and host, 
which is a percentage of the booking fee.  Id.  In Airbnb’s view, “[n]ot charging 
hosts an upfront fee for listing their rentals removes barriers to entry and makes it 
more likely for hosts to post their listings.”  Id.  HomeAway owners pay for 
services by either paying per booking, based on a percentage of the amount charged 
by the host, or buying a subscription to advertise properties for a set period.  ER-
502.  HomeAway users may arrange for rentals through online booking and for 
payments through online payment services using a third-party payment processor.  
ER-502–03. 
The Platforms do not review the hundreds of thousands of listings before the 
listings appear on their websites.  ER-391; ER-502.  But both provide information 
about local laws and require users to agree to comply with those laws.  In 
particular, Airbnb’s and HomeAway’s websites provide specific guidance about 
Santa Monica’s laws.  ER-392, ER-427–37; ER-503.  When Airbnb hosts create 
listings in Santa Monica, they must “certify that [they] will follow applicable 
laws.”  ER-428.  HomeAway owners agree they “are responsible for and agree to 
abide by all laws, rules, ordinances, or regulations applicable to the listing of their 
rental property.”  ER-524.   
Short-term rentals provide meaningful benefits to hosts and communities.  
For example, in Los Angeles, Airbnb has generated more than $1.1 billion in 
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yearly economic activity, and the typical Airbnb host has earned $7,200 per year 
from hosting on Airbnb.  ER-393–94, ER-445.  These earnings impact hosts’ lives: 
13% of Los Angeles hosts say income from hosting prevented foreclosure on their 
homes; 10% say it saved them from eviction.  ER-445.  Similarly, studies show 
that a lack of affordable accommodations prevents many Californians from 
experiencing the coast.  ER-110.  Short-term rentals are a top option for coastal 
visitors.  ER-125.  About 40% of HomeAway’s listings and 30% of Airbnb’s 
listings are for properties in the Santa Monica coastal zone.  ER-501; ER-394.   
Despite these benefits, some cities have concerns about short-term rentals.  
The Platforms are committed to working with these cities, and have undertaken 
voluntary measures to address their concerns.  E.g., ER-393, ER-440–42. 
B. Santa Monica’s Regulation of Hosting Platforms 
 
Santa Monica’s regulation of short-term rentals began in May 2015, when 
its City Council adopted Ordinance 2484CCS (“Original Ordinance”).  The 
Original Ordinance banned short-term rentals of an entire unit (“Vacation 
Rentals”), but allowed “Home-Sharing,” i.e., rental of a portion of a unit when the 
host is on site during the stay.  ER-22–24 (§§ 6.20.010(a); 6.20.020(a); 6.20.030).  
Home-Sharing hosts had to obtain a license and include license numbers in any 
listing advertised on a “Hosting Platform” like Airbnb or HomeAway.  ER-53–55.   
In addition to regulating hosts, the Original Ordinance barred “Hosting 
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Platforms” from “advertis[ing]” or “facilitat[ing]” rentals that violated Santa 
Monica’s short-term rental laws, and it expressly required them to screen and 
remove listings for rentals that Santa Monica considered unlawful.  ER-24 
(§§ 6.20.030–6.20.050).  After the Original Ordinance passed, Santa Monica issued 
the Platforms citations imposing fines in the tens of thousands of dollars, which 
they paid under protest.  ER-449–99; ER-538–82.  The citations also demanded 
that the Platforms “remove ... all ... advertisements for vacation rentals.”  E.g., ER-
452.   
Facing mounting financial penalties, Airbnb and HomeAway sued to 
invalidate the Original Ordinance.  In response, Santa Monica sought “a stay of 
proceedings to prepare and consider amendments” to “address the legal challenges 
raised” by the action.  ER-608–09.  The Santa Monica City Attorney told the 
Platforms that Santa Monica might look to the outcome of a lawsuit challenging a 
San Francisco ordinance before taking further action.  ER-43.   
San Francisco had passed a law requiring websites to verify that a rental was 
registered before publishing a listing, which the Platforms challenged.  Airbnb, Inc. 
v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1066 (N.D. Cal. 2016).  After 
Airbnb and HomeAway filed suit, San Francisco amended its law to prohibit 
platforms from providing “any reservation and/or payment service” for 
unregistered rentals.  Id. at 1071.  The district court in San Francisco denied a 
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preliminary injunction.  Id. at 1079.  The parties then settled by creating a safe 
harbor for Airbnb and HomeAway—without any admission as to the legality of the 
ordinance.  ER-63–91. 
Following San Francisco, Santa Monica amended its law on January 24, 
2017, enacting Ordinance 2535CCS (the “Ordinance”).  ER-29.  The Ordinance 
retreats from the Original Ordinance’s overt regulation of website content.  Still, it 
prohibits Hosting Platforms from completing a “Booking Transaction” for any 
listed property unless it appears on Santa Monica’s registry at the time the 
Platform receives a fee for the transaction.  ER-34–35 (§ 6.20.050(c)).  It defines 
“Booking Transaction” as “[a]ny reservation or payment service provided by a 
person who facilitates a home-sharing or vacation rental transaction between a 
prospective transient user and a host.”  ER-32 (§ 6.20.010(d)).  The Ordinance 
does not apply to bulletin board websites like Craigslist, “which do not charge for 
booking services, and act solely as publishers of advertisements for short term 
rentals.”  ER-93.   
Santa Monica made clear that the Ordinance was passed to “achiev[e]” the 
original “law’s objective”:  to compel the Platforms to eliminate all listings for 
rentals that Santa Monica considers unlawful.  ER-95.  Santa Monica targeted the 
Platforms because it claimed it is “difficult” to enforce its restrictions against 
third-party hosts without involving “internet companies which facilitate both legal 
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and illegal short term rentals.”  ER-30.   
The Ordinance requires Hosting Platforms to assist Santa Monica in 
enforcing its rental restrictions in two ways.  First, as Santa Monica conceded, the 
Ordinance requires the Platforms to “determine whether [a] unit is properly 
licensed for rental” before processing a booking for that property.  ER-617.  The 
Platforms cannot make that determination without reviewing each listing 
requested for a booking and attempting to verify that the property appears on the 
City’s registry, a process that would need to occur hundreds of times daily.  ER-
395–96; ER-504; see ER-393 (Airbnb has “approximately 1,400” Santa Monica 
listings); ER-501 (HomeAway has “more than 300” Santa Monica listings).  
Second, because listings advertise properties available for booking, the Platforms 
must take steps to comply with the Ordinance before a guest requests a booking: 
either review and remove listings of properties not on the City’s registry to prevent 
guests from clicking on properties only to find them unavailable to book, or 
change their websites in ways that make them less functional as e-commerce 
platforms.  ER-395–96; ER-504.   
The Ordinance achieves its goal of forcing Hosting Platforms to “cooperate” 
in monitoring and policing short-term rentals by imposing substantial 
administrative and criminal penalties.  ER-30.  Each violation is an infraction 
punishable by a fine of up to $250 or a misdemeanor punishable by a fine up to 
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$500, imprisonment for no more than six months, or both.  ER-36 (§ 6.20.100(a)).  
Violators also may be required to reimburse the City for investigative costs, pay 
administrative fines and penalties, and pay attorneys’ fees to anyone who brings an 
action to remedy violations.  Id. (§ 6.20.100(b), (c), (d)). 
C. District Court Preliminary Injunction Proceedings 
On December 13, 2017, the Platforms moved for a preliminary injunction 
arguing, among other things, that the Ordinance violated the CDA, the First 
Amendment, and the California Coastal Act.  On March 12, 2018, the district court 
denied that motion.  ER-1–12.  As to the CDA, the court held that the Ordinance 
“does not penalize Plaintiffs’ publishing activities; rather, it seeks to keep them 
from facilitating business transactions on their sites that violate the law.”  ER-10.  
It also held that the Ordinance does not violate the First Amendment because the 
Ordinance “regulates conduct, not speech.”  ER-11.  And it concluded that the 
Ordinance was neither procedurally nor substantively invalid under the California 
Coastal Act.  ER-6–8.  Because the district court found no likelihood of success on 
the merits, it never reached the remaining considerations relevant to entry of a 
preliminary injunction. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court abused its discretion by denying a preliminary injunction.   
I. The Platforms demonstrated a likelihood of the success on the merits. 
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A.   Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act bars Santa Monica’s 
attempt to “circumvent the CDA’s protections through ‘creative’” legislative 
draftsmanship under both express and obstacle preemption principles.  Kimzey, 836 
F.3d at 1265.  Santa Monica conceded that the Platforms cannot process bookings 
until they first “determine whether the unit is properly licensed for rental.”  ER-
617:23–25.  That determination requires the Platforms to monitor third-party 
content, which is paradigmatic publisher activity.  Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 
824 F.3d 846, 852–54 (9th Cir. 2016).  This monitoring requirement, on its own, 
triggers the CDA’s protections and requires reversal.   
But that is not the only way in which the Platforms are immune.  As a 
practical matter, the Ordinance also compels the Platforms to remove third-party 
content to prevent their websites from becoming littered with unbookable listings.  
Removing content, like monitoring, is quintessential publication activity.  Id.  The 
Ordinance is therefore doubly preempted under Section 230(e)(3), which expressly 
provides that “[n]o cause of action may be brought and no liability may be 
imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.”   
The Ordinance also stands as an obstacle to the CDA’s objectives of 
promoting the development of e-commerce and minimizing government 
intervention in the Internet.  Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1027.  If allowed to take effect, the 
Ordinance will force the Platforms to monitor and remove listings, or transform 
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themselves into 1990s-style bulletin boards—depriving consumers of the 
functionality that makes the Internet marketplace what it is today and impeding 
fulfillment of the CDA’s purposes.  Id.  The Ordinance is therefore invalid under 
conflict preemption principles as well.  Arellano v. Clark County Collection 
Service, LLC, 875 F.3d 1213, 1216 (9th Cir. 2017).   
In reaching a contrary conclusion on Section 230, the district court relied on 
a wrongly-decided, outlier district court decision concerning San Francisco’s 
similar ordinance.  Further, the record here differs in a case-dispositive way from 
the record described in San Francisco.      
B.   The Ordinance violates the First Amendment.  Because the Platforms 
cannot determine whether any particular listing is illegal based on the face of the 
advertisement, “the fear of liability might impermissibly impose a form of self-
censorship.”  Braun, 968 F.2d at 1117. The district court ignored this reality by 
concluding that the Ordinance regulates conduct, not speech.  But laws imposing a 
financial burden on protected speech are as invalid under the First Amendment as 
direct speech regulations.  This Ordinance imposes a severe financial burden and 
cannot withstand the heightened scrutiny required for content-based restrictions.  
Further, the Ordinance is invalid under the First Amendment because it purports to 
impose criminal penalties but lacks any mens rea requirement.   
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C.   The Ordinance violates the California Coastal Act because Santa 
Monica did not follow the Act’s required procedures:  it did not seek Commission 
approval for its amendment to the City’s Land Use Plan, nor did it obtain a Coastal 
Development Permit for its restriction on access to Santa Monica’s coastline.  The 
Ordinance also conflicts with the Coastal Act’s goal of ensuring “maximum 
access” to the coastal zone.  Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 30210.  It is therefore 
preempted.    
II. The Platforms will suffer irreparable harm if the Ordinance goes into 
effect.  They face severe criminal and civil penalties under a preempted law; the 
loss of free speech rights; damage to consumer goodwill; and harms from 
competitors like Craigslist that the Ordinance does not regulate. 
III.  The balance of the equities and public interest weigh heavily in the 
Platforms’ favor.  They will suffer significant irreparable harm if the Ordinance 
goes into effect, while Santa Monica can still enforce its short-term rental laws 
against hosts if the Ordinance is enjoined. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
  This Court reviews a decision denying a preliminary injunction for abuse of 
discretion.  Pimentel v. Dreyfus, 670 F.3d 1096, 1105 (9th Cir. 2012).  Legal 
conclusions are reviewed de novo.  Id.  A plaintiff is entitled to a preliminary 
injunction if it is likely to succeed on the merits; it is likely to suffer irreparable 
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harm in the absence of preliminary relief; the balance of equities tips in its favor; 
and an injunction is in the public interest.  Id.  This Court has adopted a “sliding 
scale” approach, “so that a stronger showing of one element may offset a weaker 
showing of another.”  Id. (citation omitted).  A preliminary injunction may be 
appropriate if a movant raises “serious questions going to the merits” and the 
“balance of hardships ... tips sharply towards” it, so long as the other factors are 
satisfied.  Disney Enterprises, Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 856 (9th Cir. 
2017).   
ARGUMENT 
I. SECTION 230 OF THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT 
PREEMPTS THE ORDINANCE    
 Section 230(c)(1) of the CDA immunizes websites like Airbnb and 
HomeAway from liability based on information provided by third parties.  The 
statute affords immunity when (1) a party is a “provider or user of an interactive 
computer service,” and (2) a law “seeks to treat” the party “as a publisher or 
speaker” (3) “of information provided by another information content provider.”  
Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1100–01 (9th Cir. 2009).  The first and 
third factors are indisputably met.  The only issue is whether the Ordinance 
imposes liability on the Platforms as “publishers” of information provided by their 
users.   
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 This Court has emphasized Section 230’s “broad grant” of immunity for 
“webhosts.”  Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 
521 F.3d 1157, 1174–75, 1180 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).  Other circuits have 
reached the same conclusion.  Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 755 
F.3d 398, 407 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing cases).  Section 230 “establish[es] broad 
‘federal immunity to any cause of action that would make service providers liable 
for information originating with a third-party user of the service.’”  Perfect 10, Inc. 
v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Almeida v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th Cir. 2006) and Zeran v. America 
Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997)); Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, 
LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 622 (2017) (courts 
recognize “a capacious conception of what it means to treat a website operator as 
the publisher or speaker of information provided by a third party”).1  Given Section 
230’s breadth, “close cases … must be resolved in favor of immunity.”  
Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1174.   
Applying these principles, several courts have held the CDA protects Airbnb 
and HomeAway.  E.g., La Park La Brea A LLC v. Airbnb, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 3d 
                                           
1 CDA immunity does not extend to claims arising under federal criminal law or 
intellectual property law, see 47 U.S.C. §§ 230(e)(1)–(2), nor does it extend to 
certain claims relating to prostitution or sex trafficking, id. § 230(e)(5). 
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1097, 1105 (C.D. Cal. 2017); Hiam v. HomeAway.com, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 3d 338, 
348 (D. Mass. 2017), aff’d, 2018 WL 1755803 (1st Cir. Apr. 12, 2018); MDA City 
Apartments, LLC v. Airbnb, Inc., 2018 WL 910831, at *14 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Feb. 14, 
2018); Donaher v. Vannini, 2017 WL 4518378 (Me. Super. Ct. Aug. 18, 2017).  
Section 230’s broad immunity applies equally here.   
A. The Ordinance Requires the Platforms to Monitor and Review 
the Content of Third-Party Listings 
The Ordinance treats the Platforms as “publishers” of third-party 
information by requiring them to monitor and review the content of listings that 
third-party hosts post on their websites.  Santa Monica conceded that “to provide 
booking services in connection with a unit, [Airbnb and HomeAway] will have to 
determine whether the unit is properly licensed for rental.”  ER-617:23–25.  And 
the record shows the only way for the Platforms to comply is to monitor the 
content of a third-party listing and compare it against the City’s short-term rental 
registry before allowing any booking to proceed.  This violates Section 230. 
Monitoring and reviewing third-party content are paradigmatic publisher 
activities.  This Court repeatedly has held that “publication involves reviewing, 
editing, and deciding whether to publish or to withdraw from publication third-
party content.”  Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102; Internet Brands, 824 F.3d at 852–54 (no 
CDA immunity because the duty alleged did not require defendant to “edit, 
monitor, or remove user generated content”).  Thus, in Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 
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at 1174, the Court held a website could not be liable for housing discrimination 
based on content posted by third parties because it would have to engage in the 
publisher activity of “reviewing every essay ... to distinguish unlawful 
discriminatory preferences from perfectly legitimate statements.”2     
Internet Brands illustrates the line between permissible and impermissible 
regulation.  There, this Court considered whether it was “inconsistent with section 
230(c)(1) for the State of California to require an interactive computer service 
provider to warn its users about the threat of a known sexual predator.”  824 F.3d 
at 850–51.  The plaintiff alleged that two rapists used a modeling website to lure 
her to a fake audition where she was sexually assaulted and that Internet Brands, 
the website owner, “knew about the rapists but did not warn her or the website’s 
other users.”  Id. at 848.   
On the uniquely disturbing facts of that case, the Court concluded that 
Section 230 did not bar the plaintiff’s failure-to-warn negligence claim.  The Court 
reasoned that the plaintiff’s claim had nothing to do with website content:  the 
predators were not alleged to have posted “anything to the website,” and the 
                                           
2 See Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 420 (5th Cir. 2008) (“decisions relating 
to the monitoring, screening, and deletion of content [are] actions quintessentially 
related to a publisher’s role”) (citation omitted); Green v. AOL, 318 F.3d 465, 471 
(3d Cir. 2003) (same); Fields v. Twitter, Inc., 217 F. Supp. 3d 1116, 1123 (N.D. 
Cal. 2016), aff’d, 881 F.3d 739 (9th Cir. 2018) (same).   
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plaintiff did not claim “to have been lured” or otherwise affected by any third-party 
posting.  Id. at 851.  Instead, the threat of sexual predation was already “known” to 
Internet Brands, and plaintiff’s claim therefore did not impose a duty on the 
website to “conduct[] a detailed investigation” of any content.  Id.  The Court 
emphasized that the plaintiff sought to hold Internet Brands “liable for failing to 
warn her about information it obtained [about the predators] from an outside 
source”—not for failing to monitor website content.  Id.; see id. at 849, 853.   
In so doing, the Court drew a sharp line between causes of action that 
require website operators to monitor third-party website content (from which 
websites are immune under Section 230) and those that do not require monitoring.  
Internet Brands turned on the fact that the alleged duty to warn under California 
law would not “affect” how the website “monitors ... content.”  Id. at 851.  To the 
contrary, the Court stressed that the website’s “failure to monitor postings” was not 
“at issue,” and it held that “Doe’s failure to warn claim has nothing to do with 
Internet Brands’ efforts, or lack thereof, to edit, monitor, or remove user generated 
content.”  Id. at 852 (emphasis added).3 
                                           
3 See Pennie v. Twitter, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 3d 874, 889–90 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (claims 
challenging Twitter’s provision of accounts to Hamas barred by CDA as 
“Defendants could only determine which accounts are affiliated with Hamas by 
reviewing the content published by those accounts”); Gibson v. Craigslist, Inc., 
2009 WL 1704355, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2009) (same); Stoner v. eBay, Inc., 
2000 WL 1705637, at *3 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 1, 2000) (same).    
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Santa Monica rightly does not dispute Internet Brands’ central premise that 
monitoring third-party listings qualifies as publishing activity.  Instead, it disputes 
whether the Ordinance punishes the Platforms for inadequate monitoring.  ER-
617:23–25.  But this case squarely falls on the monitoring side of the line.  To 
avoid liability for completing “Booking Transactions,” the Platforms must 
scrutinize third-party listings to determine whether the listed properties appear on 
the Santa Monica registry.  The only record evidence supports this conclusion:  To 
comply with the Ordinance, the Platforms must “monitor and screen listings to 
ensure that no booking transactions between hosts and guests occur for short-term 
rentals in Santa Monica that are not listed on the City’s registry.”  ER-395; see ER-
504.   
It is no answer, as Santa Monica suggested below, that “this challenge is 
hardly insurmountable for companies of Plaintiffs’ valuation and sophistication.”  
ER-617.  The CDA does not provide immunity for a publisher’s monitoring of 
third-party content only if it poses an “insurmountable” challenge.  Congress could 
have drafted the CDA to provide immunity only when monitoring is difficult or 
only to companies with valuations below a certain threshold.  But it did not.  Santa 
Monica admits its Ordinance requires the Platforms, at risk of steep penalties, to 
monitor and review third-party content by determining whether a posted listing is 
licensed for rental.  That admission is fatal under Section 230. 
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Moreover, Santa Monica’s suggestion that it would be easy for the Platforms 
to monitor misses the point.  The burden associated with enforcing any particular 
city’s ordinance may seem modest.  But Congress recognized that websites may 
face scores of requests from governments and private plaintiffs.  E.g., 141 Cong. 
Rec. H8471 (daily ed., Aug. 4, 1995) (“We are talking about ... thousands of pages 
of information every day, and to have that imposition imposed on [websites] is 
wrong.”) (Representative Goodlatte).  The “heart” of section 230 would be “cut 
out” by forcing websites “to face death by ten thousand duck-bites.”  
Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1174.  This Court must consider not only Santa 
Monica’s law but also the potential proliferation of laws across jurisdictions, 
imposing varied requirements on all kinds and sizes of websites.  If governments 
could impose idiosyncratic requirements like the Ordinance’s, websites would 
grind to a halt under the burden of compliance with numerous (and varied) 
monitoring regimes.  That is why Congress expressly preempted State and local 
laws “inconsistent” with Section 230’s broad immunity for monitoring and 
reviewing activity.   
B. The Ordinance Requires the Platforms to Remove Listings 
The Ordinance’s monitoring requirement, standing alone, triggers Section 
230 preemption.  But the Ordinance also is invalid because, in operation and effect, 
it forces Airbnb and HomeAway to remove third-party content.   
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The decision whether to remove third-party content is publishing activity, as 
publication involves “deciding whether to publish or to withdraw from publication 
third-party content.”  Barnes, 570 F.3d. at 1102.  “[A]ny activity that can be boiled 
down to deciding whether to exclude material that third parties seek to post online 
is perforce immune under section 230.”  Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1170–72.   
Here, the Ordinance effectively compels the Platforms to remove third-party 
listings that are not on the City’s registry.  Common sense explains why.  Guests 
visit Airbnb’s and HomeAway’s websites intending to book a rental once they 
identify a suitable property.  If their chosen property is not on the City’s registry, 
the Platforms will be unable to process the transaction without facing significant 
administrative and criminal penalties—leaving customers hanging on the verge of 
completing their transactions.  The Platforms cannot leave in place a website 
chock-full of un-bookable listings.  E.g., ER-395.  As the San Francisco court 
understood, it makes no sense to “have people spend 20 minutes doing this thing 
only to get a message at the end saying cannot book.”  ER-297.  And the 
substantial legal risks created by the Ordinance amplify the necessity of removing 
listings to avoid errors at the booking stage.  ER-395; ER-505; see ER-462 
(enforcement letter demanding Platforms “[r]emove all listings” from their sites); 
ER-463, ER- 469, ER-481–83, ER-490–92.   
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Given this unchallenged evidence and the basic realities about how hosting 
platforms work, the Ordinance operates to force Airbnb and HomeAway to remove 
user content.  That is “precisely the kind of activity for which section 230 was 
meant to provide immunity.”  Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1170.   
C. Santa Monica Cannot Evade Section 230 Immunity by Purporting 
to Target “Booking Transactions” 
The district court held that the Ordinance “falls outside the scope of the 
CDA protections” because “it does not penalize [the Platforms’] publishing 
activities; rather, it seeks to keep them from facilitating business transactions on 
their sites that violate the law.”  ER-10.  In the district court’s view, the Ordinance 
does not “require the removal of[] content provided to [the Platforms] by hosts, nor 
does it require [the Platforms] to verify content provided by hosts to ensure that 
short-term rental hosts comply with the law.”  ER-3.  Although the statute purports 
to impose liability based only on a platform’s completion of “Booking 
Transactions,” the Ordinance does much more than that:  in practice, it compels 
platforms to review, monitor, and remove content.  The district court’s form-over-
substance approach cannot be squared with this Court’s Section 230 cases or the 
Supreme Court’s preemption precedent.   
 This Court has made clear that plaintiffs may not engage in “creative 
pleading in an effort to work around” Section 230’s preemption provision.  
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Kimzey, 836 F.3d at 1265.4  The same is true for state and local legislatures, which 
are equally subject to CDA preemption.  Just as plaintiffs may not write artful 
complaints “to circumvent the CDA’s protections,” local legislatures may not 
“creative[ly]” draft ordinances to “work around” Section 230 and accomplish 
prohibited ends in a law that would be preempted if enacted directly.  Id. at 1266.  
Courts must not “open the door to such artful skirting of the CDA’s safe harbor 
provision.”  Id.  To do so would undermine the “congressional recognition that the 
Internet … ‘ha[s] flourished ... with a minimum of government regulation.’”  Id. 
(quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(4)).   
In much the same way, the Supreme Court has rejected efforts to sidestep 
federal preemption through clever statutory construction.  In two recent cases, the 
Court held that states may not “evade the pre-emptive force of federal law by 
resorting to creative statutory interpretation or description at odds with the statute’s 
intended operation and effect.”  Wos v. E.M.A. ex rel. Johnson, 568 U.S. 627, 636 
(2013); see National Meat Ass’n v. Harris, 565 U.S. 452, 464 (2012).  When 
                                           
4 “[C]ourts repeatedly have rejected attempts to recharacterize claims … to avoid 
§ 230’s prohibition on treat[ing] [the defendant] as a ‘publisher’ of information.”  
Goddard v. Google, Inc., 2008 WL 5245490, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2008); see 
MySpace, 528 F.3d at 419 (rejecting effort to recharacterize claim as “artful 
pleading” and “disingenuous”); Cohen v. Facebook, Inc., 252 F. Supp. 3d 140, 
156–58 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (same); Gonzalez v. Google, Inc., 282 F. Supp. 3d 1150 
(N.D. Cal. 2017) (same). 
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conducting a preemption analysis, courts must consider “what the state law in fact 
does, not how the litigant might choose to describe it.”  Wos, 568 U.S. at 637.   
In National Meat, for example, the Court considered the preemptive effect of 
the Federal Meat Inspection Act (“FMIA”), 21 U.S.C. § 601 et seq., which 
regulates a range of activities related to slaughterhouse operations.  The Court held 
that the FMIA preempted a California law prohibiting the sale of certain meat 
products for human consumption.  565 U.S. at 468.  California argued the FMIA 
did not preempt this aspect of its law because it regulated only the “last stage of a 
slaughterhouse’s business”—i.e., the “sale[]” of meat—rather than “a 
slaughterhouse’s ‘operations.’”  Id. at 463.    
The Court unanimously rejected this too-clever-by-half argument.  It 
reasoned that the operation and effect of the sales ban would, as a practical matter, 
regulate the very slaughterhouse activities subject to FMIA preemption—even 
though the California law on its face regulated only the post-slaughter sale of meat, 
which the FMIA’s express-preemption provision does not mention.  Id. at 464.  
The Court held that “if the sales ban were to avoid the FMIA’s preemption clause, 
then any State could impose any regulation on slaughterhouses just by framing it as 
a ban on the sale of meat produced in whatever way the State disapproved.”  Id.  
This, the Court reasoned, would “make a mockery of the FMIA’s preemption 
provision.”  Id. 
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So too here.  As in National Meat, the face of the Ordinance regulates only 
the “last stage” of the online rental process, i.e., a “booking transaction.”  But the 
liability imposed at that stage will necessarily regulate earlier stages—which is 
exactly what Santa Monica intended, just as regulating slaughterhouse operations 
is exactly what California intended in banning certain meat sales.  If the Ordinance 
remains in place, Airbnb and HomeAway will have to monitor and review third-
party content before the final stage of the booking process occurs.  Likewise, they 
will have to remove third-party content from their websites so their platforms are 
not cluttered with unbookable listings or listings that create a substantial risk of 
criminal liability if booked.  In other words, Santa Monica has done here exactly 
what the Court forbade in National Meat:  it has passed a law regulating the “sale” 
of third-party rental listings, but that law in operation and effect regulates 
preceding publishing activities protected by Section 230.     
Kimzey, National Meat, and Wos call for a far more searching and realistic 
review of the Ordinance than the district court applied.  Together, those cases 
require courts to look beyond the Ordinance’s artfully-drafted language and to 
instead examine its real-world operation and effect.  And when one considers the 
Ordinance’s operation and effect, the undisputed record demonstrates it requires 
the Platforms to review, monitor, and remove third-party content.  Applying the 
proper analytical framework, what the Ordinance “in fact does,” Wos, 568 U.S. at 
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637, clearly cannot be squared with Section 230’s broad protections.  Santa 
Monica cannot evade those immunities through “creative” statutory draftsmanship.  
Kimzey, 836 F.3d at 1265. 
D. The District Court Ignored a Well-Developed Body of Case Law 
Holding That the CDA Protects Websites Facilitating Third-Party 
Transactions 
Like Santa Monica, others have tried to sidestep Section 230 by arguing the 
CDA allows liability when websites provide transaction services connected with 
disfavored (or even unlawful) content.  But courts consistently recognize that this 
end-around does not work:  holding websites liable for transaction services based 
on the content of a listing necessarily tethers liability to publication, which 
squarely violates the CDA.  For online marketplaces like Airbnb and HomeAway, 
listings and transaction services are intertwined: the marketplace and booking 
mechanism are why hosts publish listings in the first place.  For that reason, 
“[c]ourts have granted CDA protection to websites that process payments and 
transactions in connection with third-party listings, including Airbnb.”  Park La 
Brea, 285 F. Supp. 3d at 1106; MDA City Apartments, 2018 WL 910831, at *14 
(“processing payments and transactions in connection with listings created by 
third-parties does not strip [Airbnb] of immunity under the CDA”); Donaher, 2017 
WL 4518378, at *3 (same).   
Cases involving eBay and StubHub illustrate the point.  Each site offers an 
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online marketplace, where third parties list goods (eBay) or tickets (StubHub) for 
sale.  Each was sued for facilitating allegedly illegal sales:  eBay for its “own 
participation in selling contraband musical recordings,” including by offering 
“payment services, for which additional fees are charged,” Stoner, 2000 WL 
1705637, at *2–3; and StubHub for “handling the mechanics required to complete 
... transaction[s]” in unlawfully scalped tickets and charging a “fee” for these 
services, Hill v. StubHub, Inc., 727 S.E.2d 550, 562–63 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012).  But 
both courts found that facilitating allegedly illegal sales did not “strip[] Defendant 
of its immunity under 47 U.S.C. § 230.”  Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 563; see Stoner, 2000 
WL 1705637, at *3 (same).5   
Courts reach this conclusion because the “principal objective of the 
immunity provision is to encourage commerce over the Internet by ensuring that 
interactive computer service providers are not held responsible for how third 
parties use their services.”  Stoner, 2000 WL 1705637, at *3; see Park La Brea, 
2017 WL 6799241, at *9 (holding Airbnb protected by CDA given “Congress’ 
                                           
5 Many cases have held that the CDA protects online marketplaces against claims 
stemming from their alleged facilitation or handling of unlawful third-party 
transactions.  E.g., Inman v. Technicolor USA, Inc., 2011 WL 5829024, at *6–7 
(W.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 2011); Evans v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 2013 WL 5594717, at 
*4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2013); Hinton v. Amazon.com.dedc, LLC, 72 F. Supp. 3d 
685, 689 (S.D. Miss. 2014); Milgram v. Orbitz Worldwide, Inc., 16 A.3d 1113, 
1121–22 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2010); Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 
F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1094, 1118 (W.D. Wash. 2004). 
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goal of ‘promot[ing] the development of e-commerce,’” quoting Batzel, 333 F.3d 
at 1027).  Indeed, “the threat of liability for failing to monitor effectively would, in 
the judgment of Congress, deter companies such as eBay” and other online 
marketplaces, including the Platforms, “from making their service available as 
widely and as freely as possible.”  Id.6 
A separate line of cases explains how the CDA protects processing booking 
transactions.  Courts, led by the First Circuit, have held that Section 230 bars 
attempts to regulate a website’s “overall design and operation” with respect to 
third-party content, including features related to payment services.  In Jane Doe 
No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d at 19, victims of sex trafficking brought suit 
against a website under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act.  
They alleged the website violated that Act by including certain design features that 
encouraged sex trafficking, such as a “lack of phone number verification” and the 
“acceptance of anonymous payments” for postings.  Id. at 20–21.  They insisted 
these features were part of an “affirmative course of conduct” distinct from 
traditional publishing functions that the CDA protects.  Id. at 20. 
                                           
6 The district court cited City of Chicago v. StubHub!, Inc., 624 F.3d 363, 366 (7th 
Cir. 2010), for the undisputed proposition that the CDA does not immunize non-
publishing activity.  ER-10.  Chicago involved tax collection, not reviewing, 
monitoring, or removing third-party content.  Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 563 n.4 
(distinguishing Chicago). 
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The First Circuit disagreed.  It held the “‘publisher or speaker’ language of 
section 230(c)(1) extends to the formulation of precisely the sort of website 
policies and practices” that are “part and parcel of the overall design and operation 
of the website.”  Id. at 20–21.7  It explained that the CDA barred plaintiffs’ claims 
because they “address the structure and operation of the Backpage website, that is, 
Backpage’s decisions about how to treat postings.”  Id. at 21; see Fields, 217 F. 
Supp. 3d at 1124 (following Backpage; holding that Section 230 protects 
“Twitter’s decisions to structure and operate itself as a ‘platform’” and to allow 
members of ISIS to obtain multiple accounts on that platform); Force v. Facebook, 
Inc., 2018 WL 472807, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2018) (CDA protects 
“Facebook’s decisions regarding the ‘overall design and operation of its website’” 
                                           
7 As noted above, the current version of the CDA does not provide immunity for 
certain claims relating to prostitution or sex trafficking, see supra note 1 (citing 47 
U.S.C. § 230(e)(5)).  Congress recently amended the CDA in direct response to the 
allegations in the Jane Doe No. 1.  H.R. Rep. No. 115-572, pt. 1, at 3 (2018) 
(“Unfortunately these websites, including online classified sites like Backpage.com 
… have also become one of the primary channels of sex trafficking.”); id. at 4 
(describing court cases finding Backpage.com immune under the pre-amendment 
version of Section 230); see generally Pub. L. 115–164, § 2, Apr. 11, 2018, 132 
Stat. 1255 (“It is the sense of Congress that … section 230 of the Communications 
Act of 1934 … was never intended to provide legal protection to websites that 
unlawfully promote and facilitate prostitution and websites that facilitate 
traffickers in advertising the sale of unlawful sex acts with sex trafficking 
victims.”). Congress did not, however, displace the First Circuit’s repeated 
holdings that Section 230 protects website design and operation. 
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as to third-party content).  The CDA likewise protects the Platforms’ decision to 
structure and operate their websites to include reservation and booking-related 
services for the listings third-party hosts advertise on their sites.8      
As these many courts recognize—but the district court ignored—if 
regulators could evade the CDA simply by purporting to target only websites’ 
processing of transactions resulting directly from publication, that would create a 
gaping hole in the statute’s protections for e-commerce sites.  As such, any “State 
or local law,” like Santa Monica’s Ordinance, that tries to impose liability on 
publication indirectly is “inconsistent” with Section 230 and expressly preempted.  
47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3).   
E. The Ordinance Stands as an Obstacle to the Accomplishment of 
Section 230’s Goals 
The Ordinance also is invalid under obstacle preemption principles.  The 
Ordinance strikes at the heart of Congress’s goal of promoting the development of 
e-commerce—a goal this Court expressly identified in its first Section 230 case.  
Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1027.  Although the Platforms made this obstacle preemption 
argument below, the district court never addressed it.     
                                           
8 In San Francisco, the district court stated that that the “First Circuit appears to 
take a more expansive view of Section 230(c) preemption than the Ninth Circuit,” 
217 F. Supp. 3d at 1073, but offered no analysis to support its view.  Although this 
Court has never commented on the First Circuit’s design-and-operation test, 
district courts in this Circuit have applied that test.  See, e.g., Fields, 217 F. Supp. 
3d at 1124.  
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Obstacle preemption occurs when a local ordinance conflicts with federal 
law, such that the local law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Crosby v. Nat’l 
Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372–73 (2000) (quoting Hines v. 
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).  An “obstacle” exists whether it “goes by the 
name of ‘conflicting; contrary to; repugnance; difference; irreconcilability; 
inconsistency; violation; curtailment; interference,’ or the like.”  Arellano, 875 
F.3d at 1216 (quoting Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 873 
(2000)).  “What is a sufficient obstacle is a matter of judgment, to be informed by 
examining the federal statute as a whole and identifying its purpose and intended 
effects.”  Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373. 
Congress described its purposes and objectives with respect to Section 230 
in the statute itself.  In Section 230(a), Congress listed a series of “Findings,” 
including that the “Internet and other interactive computer services have 
flourished, to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of government 
regulation.”  Section 230(b) sets forth Congress’s policy objectives.  They include: 
(1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and 
other interactive computer services and other interactive media; 
(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that 
presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer 
services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation. 
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Summarizing these findings and objectives, this Court has held that “Section 
230 was enacted, in part, to maintain the robust nature of Internet communication, 
and accordingly, to keep government interference in the medium to a minimum.” 
Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1027 (citations omitted).  Congress recognized that the Internet 
could not flourish if intermediaries could be held liable for third-party content, 
“given the volume of material communicated through [those intermediaries], the 
difficulty of separating lawful from unlawful speech, and the relative lack of 
incentives to protect lawful speech.”  Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v Lycos, Inc., 
478 F.3d 413, 418–19 (1st Cir. 2007).  Section 230 thus “sought to prevent 
lawsuits from shutting down websites and other services on the Internet.”  Batzel, 
333 F.3d at 1027–28 (emphasis added).   
More specifically, this Court and others have held that one of Congress’s 
principal purposes in enacting Section 230 was to “encourage the unfettered and 
unregulated development of free speech on the Internet, and to promote the 
development of e-commerce.”  Id. at 1027.  “[T]here is little doubt that the Cox-
Wyden amendment, which added what ultimately became § 230 to the Act, sought 
to further First Amendment and e-commerce interests on the Internet while also 
promoting the protection of minors.”  Id. at 1028 (emphasis added).  This Court 
has since reiterated this congressional purpose.  In Roommates.com, for example, 
the Court (sitting en banc) noted that the “intent of Congress” was to “preserve the 
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free-flowing nature of Internet speech and commerce without unduly prejudicing 
the enforcement of other important state and federal laws.”  521 F.3d at 1175 
(emphasis added).  The D.C. Circuit recently explained how well Congress 
achieved its goal, as Section 230 “paved the way for a robust new forum for public 
speech as well as a trillion-dollar industry centered around user-generated content.” 
Bennett v. Google, LLC, 882 F.3d 1163, 1166 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
The Ordinance imposes a direct obstacle to this congressional goal.  
Exposure to criminal and civil liability for completing “Booking Transactions” 
would force the Platforms to fundamentally alter what has made them so 
successful in the e-commerce marketplace.  If state and local authorities could 
freely regulate online transactions directly resulting from the posting of third-party 
content, then online marketplaces would no longer be able to engage in the vibrant 
e-commerce that has made the Internet what it is today.  E-commerce generally—
not just in the short-term rental industry—would be dramatically set back.   
As the undisputed record evidence demonstrates, if this direct regulation on 
e-commerce is allowed to stand, Airbnb and HomeAway will be forced to turn 
back the clock on e-commerce.  As the district court recognized, the “Ordinance 
does not apply to websites like Craigslist, ‘which do not charge for booking 
services, and act solely as publishers of advertisements for short term rentals.’”  
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ER-4 (quoting ER-93).  Thus, as an alternative to complying with the Ordinance by 
engaging in the publisher activities of monitoring, reviewing, and removing 
content, the Platforms may be forced to “stop payment and transaction processing 
services altogether in connection with third-party listings in Santa Monica,” 
transforming themselves into 1990s-style bulletin boards.  ER-396 (noting that this 
would require a “fundamental redesign of [Airbnb’s] business model, website, and 
platform”); ER-504 (same).  
This makes no sense, especially when one considers Congress’s goals of 
promoting a vibrant, flourishing Internet and the development of e-commerce.  
Under the district court’s reasoning, Craigslist could publish the exact same listing 
as the Platforms—advertising the exact same unregistered short-term rental—but 
only Craigslist would be immunized under the CDA because it has less advanced 
functionality and less appeal to modern online consumers.  Congress did not intend 
to freeze e-commerce in amber in this fashion.  E.g., Park La Brea, 285 F. Supp. 
3d at 1104 (“Immunity is not foreclosed simply because a website offers more than 
a ‘bulletin board’ service”); Stoner, 2000 WL 1705637, at *3 (same).9    
                                           
9 Even if the Platforms did not have to fully convert to Craigslist-like platforms, 
they still would have to fundamentally alter their websites in ways that undermine 
the benefits of modern e-commerce and violate the CDA in other ways.  Requiring 
up-front monitoring of listings before “Booking Transactions” to avoid civil and 
criminal liability “would significantly delay the time it takes for a listing to appear 
on the websites as well as for a booking to occur,” which “would undermine two 
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Airbnb and HomeAway are not the only e-commerce platforms that will 
suffer from the district court’s erroneous interpretation of Section 230.  Since the 
CDA was passed, other online third-party marketplaces have succeeded by using 
precisely the type of transaction model the Ordinance would thwart.  “In the 
modern world of e-commerce, users simply expect that they will be able to enter 
into transactions online for goods and services advertised on platforms like 
Airbnb.”  ER-396.  In no small part because of the immunity afforded by the CDA, 
the Internet has evolved well beyond the basic newsgroups and bulletin boards that 
existed decades ago.  Consumers now have access to a wide range of third-party 
marketplaces, including established sites like Amazon, eBay, and StubHub, and a 
host of smaller websites like Etsy, Houzz, and Thumbtack.  These services are 
some of the most successful and popular platforms on the Internet today.  But the 
Ordinance—and the myriad laws and legal claims that will proliferate if the district 
court’s ruling is affirmed—jeopardizes that success by purporting to regulate 
transactions as a way to regulate content sub rosa.  
Independent studies establish the importance of modern e-commerce 
platforms like Airbnb and HomeAway.  For example, one study by the federal 
government describes these platform-based marketplaces as the heirs to the early e-
                                                                                                                                        
key benefits of” the Platforms’ websites, “speed and efficiency.”  ER-504; see also 
ER-395 (same).     
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commerce websites that emerged when the CDA was enacted and this Court was 
first interpreting it in Batzel.10  According to a 2016 Pew Research Center report, 
50% of Americans have purchased goods on eBay and similar sites; 28% have 
purchased tickets on sites like StubHub; 22% have purchased handmade products 
on sites like Etsy; and 11% have used short-term rental sites like Airbnb and 
HomeAway.11  These e-commerce platforms generate billions of dollars for the 
U.S. and global economies, and they are expected to grow exponentially.  For 
example, according to a 2014 study by PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, platform-
based markets generated an estimated $15 billion in global revenues in 2013, 
which could grow to up to $335 billion by 2025.12     
                                           
10 Rudy Telles, Jr., Economics and Statistics Administration, Digital Matching 
Firms: A New Definition in the “Sharing Economy” Space, 2, 10 (June 3, 2016) 
https://www.esa.gov/sites/default/files/digital-matching-firms-new-definition-
sharing-economy-space.pdf (“What began as small and informal online exchanges 
of goods and services via message boards and rudimentary websites has, with the 
widespread adoption of fast, reliable mobile smartphones and access to GPS, 
evolved into a collection of firms that connect millions of consumers with other 
private citizens who can provide goods and services quickly and efficiently.…  As 
with the introduction of e-commerce in the 1990s, Internet-based technologies in 
the form of digital matching apps have the potential to disrupt existing markets.”).  
11 See Aaron Smith, Pew Research Center, Shared, Collaborative, and On 
Demand: The New Digital Economy, 53 (2016), http://www.pewinternet.org/files/ 
2016/05/PI_2016.05.19_Sharing-Economy_FINAL.pdf.   
12 See PricewaterhouseCoopers, The Sharing Economy – Sizing the Revenue 
Opportunity (2015), http://www.pwc.co.uk/issues/megatrends/collisions/sharing 
economy/the-sharing-economy-sizing-the-revenueopportunity.html. 
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While the existence of these e-commerce platforms may not have been 
predictable to Congress in 1996, this dynamic innovation is exactly what Congress 
intended to promote when it enacted the CDA.  Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1101 (noting 
that the CDA’s “scope … differs from its genesis,” and the “language of the statute 
does not limit its application” to just the types of cases and technologies that 
existed at the time Congress enacted Section 230).  Forcing the Platforms to 
shoulder the burden of monitoring and removing listings, or to convert themselves 
into Craigslist-like websites, would indisputably impede this progress.  And that 
result would stand as an obstacle to a core purpose of the CDA:  “promot[ing] the 
development of e-commerce.”  Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1027.   
F. San Francisco Is a Wrongly Decided Outlier  
The district court rested its cursory Section 230 analysis on the reasoning of 
an earlier district court decision, Airbnb, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco, 
which found Section 230 did not preempt San Francisco’s similar ordinance.  217 
F. Supp. 3d at 1076.  But San Francisco’s reasoning was incorrect, and the 
decision (like the decision here) ignores the many cases recognizing the CDA’s 
protection of e-commerce.  The district court erred in giving that flawed, outlying 
decision dispositive effect. 
As an initial matter, San Francisco turned on the district court’s 
characterization of the record in that case.  San Francisco denied CDA immunity 
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because plaintiffs “failed to submit evidence showing that the Ordinance will in 
fact inevitably or perforce require them to monitor, remove or do anything at all to 
the content that hosts post.”  217 F. Supp. 3d at 1075.  Here, however, undisputed 
evidence establishes that Airbnb and HomeAway will have to review and monitor 
third-party content to comply with the Ordinance.  Supra at 11 (discussing ER-
395–96, ER-504).  In fact, Santa Monica concedes the Platforms cannot comply 
with the Ordinance unless they “determine whether the unit is properly licensed for 
rental” before proceeding with each booking.  ER-617:23–25.  Thus, the record 
conclusively shows that the Ordinance will require the Platforms to engage in the 
very sort of review and monitoring of listings that Section 230 protects against.  
As to content removal, San Francisco faulted the plaintiffs for failing to 
show it was “inevitable” that third-party content would be withdrawn from their 
websites.  217 F. Supp. 3d at 1075.  But San Francisco ignored the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Wos, which spoke in terms of assessing a statute’s “operation 
and effect” and what a law “in fact does.”  568 U.S. at 636–37.  Wos does not 
speak in terms of inevitability.13  And as a practical matter, the Ordinance violates 
the CDA because it conscripts Airbnb and HomeAway into enforcing the City’s 
                                           
13 National Meat discussed the “inevitable” effects of the California law at issue, 
565 U.S. at 464, but Wos followed that case and did not adopt any inevitability 
standard.  Instead, Wos turned on the state law’s “intended operation and effect.”  
568 U.S. at 636.   
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rental laws by forcing them to remove non-compliant third-party content from their 
websites.  E.g., ER-395.14 
Even if San Francisco’s “inevitability” test were good law, San Francisco 
erred because the CDA equally preempts the alternative to compliance it identified, 
i.e., platforms “charging fees for publishing listings, rather than for facilitating 
transactions.”  217 F. Supp. 3d at 1075.  Under this purported alternative, the 
Platforms would be forced to abandon their roles as e-commerce intermediaries 
altogether.  E.g., ER-396.  Hosts would be able to advertise available properties, 
but guests and hosts would have to arrange payment separately for any rentals 
outside of the Platforms’ websites.  But as explained above, the CDA preempts any 
law that would force the Platforms to redesign their websites in this way—even 
assuming a viable market still exists for such platforms.   
San Francisco found hosting platforms could comply with the ordinance 
there by either (a) removing content (which would plainly run afoul of Section 
230’s explicit protection of publisher activity) or (b) fundamentally transforming 
and regressing their modern e-commerce platforms to eliminate the booking 
                                           
14 Worse than the actual effect of the Ordinance—i.e., “what it in fact does,” Wos, 
568 U.S. at 637—forcing the removal of content appears to have been Santa 
Monica’s intent.  When it enacted the Original Ordinance, Santa Monica demanded 
that platforms “remove all listings,” and the revised Ordinance states its policy 
purpose as furthering the “objectives” of the original law, supra at 23.  The City’s 
consistent (and unlawful) intent is unmistakable. 
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function (which would stand as an obstacle to Congress’s goals of developing e-
commerce and minimizing government regulation on the Internet).  As explained 
above, the CDA preempts the Ordinance either way.  The district court therefore 
erred in relying on San Francisco, ignoring the many contrary decisions across the 
country, and falling for the same “artful” draftsmanship that renders the Ordinance 
preempted by the CDA, Kimzey, 836 F.3d at 1269. 
II. THE ORDINANCE VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT  
A. The Ordinance Impermissibly Burdens Commercial Speech 
The district court separately erred in holding that the Platforms’ “First 
Amendment claims will not succeed.”  ER-12.  It rejected the Platforms’ First 
Amendment claim because, in its view, the Ordinance targets only “a business 
transaction to secure a short-term rental,” which it viewed as pure “conduct” 
without “any significant expressive element.”  Id.  This reasoning misconstrues and 
misapplies settled First Amendment law.15  The Ordinance violates the First 
                                           
15 The district court relied heavily on this Court’s decision in International 
Franchise Association, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 803 F.3d 389, 408 (9th Cir. 2015), 
which held that the “threshold question is whether conduct with a significant 
expressive element drew the legal remedy or the ordinance has the inevitable effect 
of singling out those engaged in expressive activity.”  (Citation and quotation 
marks omitted.)  But the district court addressed only the first half of that standard, 
holding that “the conduct banned by the Ordinance—booking transactions for 
residential properties not listed on the City’s registry—does not have such a 
‘significant expressive element’ as to draw First Amendment protection.”  ER-11.  
It ignored the second half of that standard:  whether the Ordinance has the “effect 
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Amendment because it imposes a content-based financial burden on commercial 
speech by requiring the Platforms to screen advertisements, which are not illegal 
on their face, to avoid severe penalties.    
This Court can easily dispose of the district court’s exclusive focus on 
“conduct.”  The Supreme Court has long held that laws imposing a “financial 
burden” on a speaker’s expression are subject to First Amendment scrutiny, even if 
they do not directly regulate expression.  Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 
566 (2011); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 
U.S. 575, 593 (1983) (special tax on printer’s ink impermissibly burdened First 
Amendment rights); Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 
620, 632 (1980) (municipality violated the First Amendment by requiring solicitors 
to donate to charity a percentage of proceeds received from door-to-door 
solicitation; although the ordinance did not on its face limit speech, it did so 
indirectly, since solicitation was “characteristically intertwined” with speech).  
“Lawmakers may no more silence unwanted speech by burdening its utterance than 
by censoring its content.”  Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 566.  “If government were free to 
suppress disfavored speech by preventing potential speakers from being paid, there 
                                                                                                                                        
of targeting expressive activity.”  Int’l Franchise Ass’n, 803 F.3d at 409.  As 
explained below, the Ordinance has precisely that effect by imposing a severe 
financial and criminal burden on commercial speech.   
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would not be much left of the First Amendment.”  Pitt News v. Pappert, 379 F.3d 
96, 106 (3d Cir. 2004) (Alito, J.). 
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime Victims Board, 
502 U.S. 105 (1991), illustrates this principle.  In that case, the Court struck down 
New York’s “Son of Sam” law, which limited a convicted criminal’s ability to 
profit from expressive works related to his crime.  The “Son of Sam” law did not 
facially restrain any speech.  Instead, it merely required the author to pay to the 
victim of his crime any money he would earn from his publication.  But even 
though the law regulated “conduct”—receiving payment for published works—the 
Court held that New York’s restriction “establishes a financial disincentive to 
create or publish works with a particular content.”  Id. at 118.  It made no 
difference whether the “speaker” was the criminal who wrote the book or the 
publishing company that sold it.  Id.  No matter who was considered the “speaker,” 
the Court concluded the statute was “inconsistent with the First Amendment” 
because “New York has singled out speech on a particular subject for a financial 
burden that it places on no other speech and no other income.”  Id. at 123.   
Here, the Ordinance puts the Platforms in the same position as Simon & 
Schuster—only worse because they do not know which third-party listings are 
unregistered.  What’s more, the Ordinance imposes the same financial burdens on 
Airbnb, HomeAway, and the third-party hosts that advertise home rentals.  The 
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record establishes (and Santa Monica does not dispute) that Airbnb and 
HomeAway receive compensation for publication services by charging fees for 
bookings of listings advertised on their sites (and not just charging for listings 
themselves).  Supra at 6–7.  The Ordinance levies severe financial and criminal 
penalties on those bookings and hosting platforms’ receipt of fees in connection 
with them: failure to comply with the Ordinance can result in hosting platforms 
facing civil penalties up to $250 per violation and criminal penalties up to $500 
and/or up to six months imprisonment per violation, as well as administrative fines 
and penalties.  ER-36; see Santa Monica Municipal Code §§ 1.09–1.10.  In 
substance, those fines and penalties (compounded by the added burden of criminal 
sanctions) have the same effect as New York seizing the proceeds of a criminal’s 
sale of his expressive work.  A law, like the Ordinance, that prevents parties “from 
receiving payments for running … ads … clearly restricts speech.”  Pitt News, 379 
F.3d at 105–06.  It makes no difference that the Ordinance chills commercial 
speech (advertisements for third-party rentals) rather than a convict’s movie, book, 
or magazine article.  Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977) (a 
“consumer’s concern for the free flow of commercial speech often may be far 
keener than his concern for urgent political dialogue”); Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 566–
67.  What matters for First Amendment purposes is that the “financial burden” 
imposed by Santa Monica’s Ordinance, like New York’s law, “operate[s] as [a] 
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disincentive[] to speak.”  Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 105.  The Ordinance thus 
regulates “speech,” even if it does so by penalizing certain “Booking 
Transactions.”  
The district court also did not consider the consequences of its overbroad 
conduct/speech distinction.  If accepted, the district court’s theory would allow the 
government to ban a wide swath of otherwise protected speech, especially on the 
Internet.  Rather than prohibit advertisements for disfavored goods or services, the 
government could instead forbid websites from processing sales of the same 
goods—knowing this will curb the protected speech embodied in advertising.  
Similarly, it could impose onerous licensing requirements on any website 
permitting third-party advertising.  It could even regulate paid online content—a 
digital subscription to the L.A. Times, for example—by limiting publishers’ 
payment processing terms.  The First Amendment does not tolerate such indirect 
regulation of protected expression.  Yet that that is exactly what Santa Monica has 
done here—and exactly what the district court authorized with its narrow 
conception of First Amendment “speech.” 
Because it failed to grapple with the fact that speech can be chilled by 
targeting conduct, the district court did not consider whether the Ordinance chills 
speech.  But it does exactly that.  Although the First Amendment does not protect 
advertisements promoting obviously illegal activity, Pittsburgh Press Co. v. 
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Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 388–89 (1973), it does 
protect advertisements that do not on their face invite illegal activity, Braun, 968 
F.2d at 1118–19; Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 880 F.2d 830, 837 
(5th Cir. 1989).  Indeed, the First Amendment must protect advertisements that do 
not invite illegality on their face; otherwise, “the fear of liability might 
impermissibly impose a form of self-censorship on publishers.”  Braun, 968 F.2d 
at 1117.  “The absence of a duty requiring publishers to investigate the 
advertisements they print … guarantee[s] that the burden placed on publishers will 
not impermissibly chill protected commercial speech.”  Id. at 1119.   
Here, listings are not unlawful on their face.  The ads do not show whether a 
property is registered as a lawful homeshare.  ER-34–35.  And even if the property 
does not appear on Santa Monica’s registry when listed, a later “Booking 
Transaction” may be lawful, as the host may register the property after posting the 
listing, but before the booking occurs.  As a result, the Platforms cannot know 
merely by reviewing their listings whether the commercial speech they publish on 
their websites proposes an illegal transaction; at a minimum, compliance with the 
Ordinance would require them to “investigate the advertisements they print,” 
raising the risk that commercial speech will be “impermissibly chill[ed].”  Braun, 
968 F.2d at 1119.  And the undisputed evidence shows this lack of facial clarity 
can cause hosting platforms to overcompensate by removing lawful listings:  
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“[G]iven the prospect of criminal punishment and hefty fines, if [a platform] has 
any doubt about the lawfulness of a particular listing, it will likely have to remove 
the listing, even if the listing owner has complied with the law.”  ER-505.  This 
chilling effect imposes a “burden on protected expression” that violates the First 
Amendment.  Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 565. 
B. The Ordinance Is Content-Based and Cannot Survive Heightened 
Scrutiny 
The Ordinance is subject to heightened scrutiny as a content-based 
restriction on speech.  Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 570.  Because the Ordinance regulates 
speech based on whether the listings advertise short-term rentals, it is 
“presumptively unconstitutional.”  Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 
(2015).   
Typically, “it is all but dispositive to conclude that a law is content-based.”  
Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 571. “[I]t is [Santa Monica’s] burden to justify its content-
based law as consistent with the First Amendment.”  Id. at 571–72.  It must show 
that the law “directly advances a substantial governmental interest,” and there 
must be a “fit between the legislature’s ends and the means chosen to accomplish 
those ends.”  Id. at 572.  If the City “could achieve its interests in a manner that 
does not restrict speech, or that restricts less speech, [it] must do so.”  Thompson v. 
W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 371 (2002). 
Santa Monica cannot satisfy this stringent standard.  At bottom, the 
  49 
Ordinance is designed to regulate unlawful rentals.  It achieves that end by 
conscripting hosting platforms into Santa Monica’s enforcement efforts by 
punishing them if they allow a transaction for a listing for an unregistered property.  
But Santa Monica has an available enforcement mechanism without any effect on 
the Platforms’ commercial speech.  “The normal method for deterring unlawful 
conduct is to impose an appropriate punishment on the person who engages in it.”  
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 529–30 (2001).  The City can (and does) review 
listings and enforce the Ordinance against hosts who operate unlawful rentals.  ER-
351, ER-355 (noting effectiveness of City enforcement); see Backpage.com, LLC v. 
McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1284 (W.D. Wash. 2012) (invalidating law 
banning sex ads because state “fail[ed] to demonstrate why a law targeting only the 
individuals who post ads would not be effective”).   
It makes no difference that “[f]ull enforcement of the underlying ordinances 
may be costly and difficult.”  News & Sun Sentinel Co. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 693 
F. Supp. 1066, 1073 (S.D. Fla. 1987).  Santa Monica was, of course, motivated by 
that concern here.  “[E]nforcement of the City’s regulations on home-sharing … 
can be extremely difficult without the cooperation of Internet companies which 
facilitate both legal and illegal short term rentals.”  ER-30.  But the City may not 
“shift[] the burden of enforcing the law” simply because it would be easier or less 
expensive.  News & Sun Sentinel, 693 F. Supp. at 1072.  Because the City has 
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available alternatives to address illegal home rentals, the law is “more extensive 
than necessary” and therefore violates the First Amendment.  Rubin v. Coors 
Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 491 (1995). 
Further, the Ordinance is not tailored to its asserted purpose.  It applies only 
to hosting platforms that receive a fee for a booking (such as the Platforms), not to 
online (or offline) bulletin board sites that advertise the very same properties but 
have no booking functionality (like Craigslist).  The City Council report in support 
of the Original Ordinance, however, makes clear that hosts use bulletin board sites 
to list short-term rental properties, just as they use Airbnb and HomeAway; indeed, 
the report begins by identifying “Craigslist” as a primary site where hosts post 
listings.  ER-359.  By not regulating bulletin board sites, the Ordinance leaves 
untouched a significant category of websites that facilitate unregistered short-term 
rentals.  This under-inclusiveness “raises serious doubts about whether the 
government is in fact pursuing the interest it invokes, rather than disfavoring a 
particular speaker.”  Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 802 (2011); 
ForSaleByOwner.com Corp. v. Zinnemann, 347 F. Supp. 2d 868, 878–80 (E.D. 
Cal. 2004).   
Because the Ordinance cannot withstand heightened scrutiny, the Platforms 
are likely to succeed on their First Amendment claim.   
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C. The Ordinance Lacks a Scienter Requirement  
The Ordinance also violates the First Amendment because it imposes 
criminal penalties on publishers of listings without requiring that they know the 
listings at issue are unlawful.   
“[C]riminal responsibility may not be imposed without some element of 
scienter on the part of the defendant.”  New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765 
(1982); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).  In defiance of this principle, the 
Ordinance makes it unlawful for any Hosting Platform to “complete any booking 
transaction” for a property “unless it is listed on the City’s registry … at the time 
the hosting platform receives a fee for the booking transaction,” ER-34–35, 
regardless of whether the platform knows the property is not on the registry.  By 
imposing criminal penalties on publishers without any mens rea requirement, the 
Ordinance violates the First Amendment.16 
III. THE ORDINANCE VIOLATES THE CALIFORNIA COASTAL ACT 
The district court also erred in concluding that the Platforms failed to 
demonstrate they would likely succeed in showing the Ordinance violates the 
                                           
16 This Court cannot construe the Ordinance to escape this scienter problem.  
Planned Parenthood of Idaho, Inc. v. Wasden, 376 F.3d 908, 925 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(declining to narrowly construe Idaho statute to avoid constitutional issue).  When 
faced with a state statute, federal courts “are without power to adopt a narrowing 
construction ... unless [it] is reasonable and readily apparent.”  Boos v. Barry, 485 
U.S. 312, 330 (1988).  No such construction is “readily apparent” here:  adding a 
scienter requirement would conflict with the Ordinance’s text.   
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California Coastal Act.  
The Act regulates all development in a zone extending inland 1,000 yards 
from the California coast, including portions of Santa Monica.  Cal. Pub. Res. 
Code § 30103.  The Coastal Act does not displace a local government’s ability to 
regulate land use, but it expressly preempts conflicting local regulations.  Id. 
§ 30005(a); see Yost v. Thomas, 36 Cal.3d 561, 573 (1984).  Its express purpose is 
to ensure public access to California’s coastline:  “Lower cost visitor and 
recreational facilities shall be protected, encouraged, and, where feasible, 
provided.”  Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 30213.  “[T]he Coastal Act is to be ‘liberally 
construed to accomplish its purposes and objectives.’”  Pacific Palisades Bowl 
Mobile Estates, LLC v. City of Los Angeles, 55 Cal.4th 783, 796 (2012) (quoting 
Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 30009).   
The Act achieves its purposes by, inter alia, requiring local governments in 
the coastal zone to prepare a Local Coastal Program (“LCP”), which includes a 
Land Use Plan (“LUP”).  Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 30500.  An LUP must “indicate 
the kinds, location, and intensity of land uses, the applicable resource protection 
and development policies, and, where necessary, a listing of implementing 
actions.”  Id. § 30108.5.  The Coastal Commission administers the Act.  It must 
review and certify LCPs and any amendments thereto.  If a locality does not have 
an LCP and wants to engage in “development” in the coastal zone, it must apply to 
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the Commission for a Coastal Development Permit (“CDP”).  “Development” is 
defined as any “change[s] in the density or intensity of use of land.”  Id. § 30106.   
In December 2016—just one month before Santa Monica passed the 
Ordinance—the Commission sent a letter to all coastal planning and community 
development directors, including Santa Monica, emphasizing that local policies 
limiting vacation rentals in the coastal zone violate the Act:  “[V]acation rental 
prohibitions unduly limit public recreational access opportunities inconsistent with 
the Coastal Act.” ER-228; see ER-227 (vacation rental regulation must be 
approved by the Commission).  The City nonetheless ignored the Coastal Act’s 
requirements—and the Coastal Commission’s specific directives regarding short-
term rental regulation.   
A. The Ordinance Is Substantively Invalid Under the Coastal Act  
The district court did not address whether the Ordinance substantively 
violated the Coastal Act.  Instead, it held only that the Commission’s “comments 
regarding its interpretation of the Coastal Act are not binding on the Court.”  ER-8.  
Had it considered the substance, as it should have, a preliminary injunction would 
have been unavoidable.   
The Ordinance’s restrictions on short-term rentals in the coastal zone 
conflict with the Coastal Act’s policy of “maximum access” to the California coast 
and promoting “recreational opportunities” in the coastal zone.  Cal. Pub. Res. 
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Code § 30210; see Yost, 36 Cal.3d 561, 573.  Even more specifically, the 
Ordinance conflicts with the Act’s emphasis that “[l]ower cost visitor and 
recreational facilities shall be protected [and] encouraged.”  Cal. Pub. Res. Code 
§ 30213.  Indeed, the Act makes clear that “visitor-serving commercial recreational 
facilities designed to enhance public opportunities for coastal recreation shall have 
priority over private residential ... development.”  Id. § 30222; see Greenfield v. 
Mandalay Shores Cmty. Ass’n, 230 Cal.Rptr.3d 827, 828 (Ct. App. 2018).   
For these reasons, the Commission has rejected blanket vacation rental bans, 
like the Ordinance’s, as being inconsistent with the Act.  ER-289, ER-250, ER-
228, ER-593–94.17  The Commission has emphasized that these restrictions 
conflict with the Act’s policy to “[m]aximize public access to and along the coast 
and maximize public recreational opportunities in the coastal zone.”  Cal. Pub. 
Res. Code § 30001.5(c).   
Because the Ordinance substantively conflicts with both the Act and the 
Commission’s reasonable interpretation of it, state law preempts it. Yost, 36 Cal.3d 
                                           
17 Courts must “defer to the Commission’s interpretation” where it is “reasonable 
and in keeping with the purposes of the [Coastal Act or] LCP.”  Redell v. Cal. 
Coastal Comm’n, 180 Cal.App.4th 956, 968 (2009); see Divers’ Envtl. 
Conservation Org. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 145 Cal.App.4th 246, 252 
(2006).  Refusing to defer to the Coastal Commission would lead to “unwarranted 
uncertainty in connection with many local coastal program amendment approvals.”  
Ross v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 199 Cal.App.4th 900, 938 (2011). 
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at 572–73; Pac. Palisades Bowl, 55 Cal.4th at 793–94 (“[A] fundamental purpose 
of the Coastal Act is to ensure that state policies prevail over the concerns of local 
government” within the coastal zone.).  The district court should have enjoined its 
enforcement.   
B. The Ordinance Is Procedurally Invalid Under the Coastal 
Act  
Santa Monica failed to comply with the Coastal Act’s procedural 
requirements in two ways.   
First, the Ordinance amends the City’s LUP by regulating short-term rentals.  
As the Coastal Commission has stated, under the Coastal Act, “vacation rentals are 
a form of residential use, permitted by right, in any residentially zoned area unless 
such uses are specifically prohibited or otherwise restricted.”  ER-289 (emphasis 
added).  Despite Santa Monica’s contention to the contrary in the district court, it 
never “direct[ly] ban[ned]” short-term rentals until it enacted the Ordinance.  ER-
1815.  Santa Monica’s failure to obtain Commission approval for this amendment 
was unlawful.  Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 30514(a), (b), (e); 14 Cal. Code Regs. 
§ 13554(d)(3); 70 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 220, 1987 WL 247254 (Sept. 10, 1987); see 
Napa Valley Educators’ Ass’n v. Napa Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 194 Cal.App.3d 
243, 251 (1987) (“Opinions of the Attorney General, while not binding, are entitled 
to great weight.”).    
Santa Monica argued below that it can evade Commission review because it 
  56 
did not label the Ordinance as an amendment to its certified Land Use Plan 
(“LUP”).  ER-626.  But labels do not control.  The Act requires Commission 
review whenever a city seeks to “impose further conditions, restriction or 
limitations” on land use in the coastal zone, if the changes “conflict with any 
policy of Chapter 3 of the Coastal Act or with any other certified land use plan 
policy.”  14 Cal. Code Regs. § 13554(d)(3); see 70 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 220, 1987 
WL 247254, at *6.  That is exactly what Santa Monica did here.   
Santa Monica also argued that the law requiring Commission approval of 
Local Coastal Plan (“LCP”) amendments does not apply because the City has no 
certified LCP.  But the Attorney General has determined that the Coastal Act’s 
amendment provisions apply to LUPs as well as LCPs.  70 Ops. Cal. Att’y Gen. 
220, 1987 WL 247254, at *4.  And none of the precedent analyzing the Coastal 
Act’s procedural requirements is limited to LCPs or excludes amendments to 
LUPs.  E.g., Douda v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 159 Cal.App.4th 1181, 1192 (2008).   
The district court nevertheless deferred decision on this issue until the parties 
could present evidence whether Santa Monica enforced its purported “pre-
Ordinance” ban on short-term rentals.  ER-7.  But the record shows that properties 
historically were available for short-term rentals in Santa Monica.  ER-1815.  And 
the record contains no evidence of any action to prevent, stop, or punish a resident 
from offering their home for a short-term rental before Santa Monica’s recent 
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regulatory efforts.  Thus, the City’s enforcement of the Ordinance would 
undisputedly change access to the coast.  City of Dana Point v. Cal. Coastal 
Comm’n, 217 Cal.App.4th 170, 208 (2013) (relevant question is enforcement); 
Surfrider Foundation v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 26 Cal.App.4th 151, 158 (1994) 
(imposition of access fees fell within the scope of Coastal Commission’s authority).  
The district court erred by not immediately enjoining the Ordinance.   
Second, the Ordinance constitutes “development” and therefore requires a 
CDP from the Commission.  The district court ruled to the contrary, concluding 
that “development” does not include “city-wide land-use regulations.”  ER-8.  But 
the court cited nothing in support of its cramped definition of “development,” id., 
and “courts have given the term ‘development’ an ‘expansive interpretation ... 
consistent with the mandate that the Coastal Act is to be ‘liberally construed to 
accomplish its purposes and objectives.’”  Surfrider Foundation v. Martins Beach 
1, LLC, 14 Cal.App.5th 238, 252 (2017), petition for cert. filed, 17-1198 (U.S. Feb. 
26, 2018) (citation omitted).  “[D]evelopment goes beyond what is commonly 
regarded as a development of real property and is not restricted to activities that 
physically alter the land or water.”  Id. at 252 (citation omitted); see Gualala 
Festivals Comm. v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 183 Cal.App.4th 60, 67 (2010).   
Here, the City does not have a certified LCP.  As a result, all “development” 
in its coastal zone requires a CDP issued by the Commission.  Cal. Pub. Res. Code 
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§ 30600(a).  The Commission itself has stated that short-term rental restrictions 
change “the intensity of use and access to the shoreline,” making them 
“development.”  ER-227.  And the California Court of Appeal agrees, recently 
holding in a published decision that a short-term rental ban “changes the intensity 
of use and access” and therefore constitutes “development” under the Coastal Act.  
Greenfield, 230 Cal.Rptr.3d at 830.   
Santa Monica therefore violated the Act procedurally because it failed to 
obtain a CDP before implementing the Ordinance in the coastal zone.   
IV. THE PLATFORMS FACE IRREPARABLE HARM ABSENT AN 
INJUNCTION 
Although the district court did not reach the issue of irreparable harm, the 
harms resulting from the Ordinance are clear.      
First, the Platforms face the threat of prosecution and hefty penalties under a 
preempted law.  That alone constitutes irreparable harm.  Morales v. Trans World 
Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 381 (1992) (“irreparable injury” where plaintiffs faced 
choice between “expos[ing] themselves to potentially huge liability” or 
“suffer[ing] the injury of obeying” preempted law); Valle del Sol Inc. v. Whiting, 
732 F.3d 1006, 1029 (9th Cir. 2013) (“irreparable harm” where plaintiff 
“demonstrated a credible threat of prosecution” under preempted state law). 
Second, the Ordinance will impair consumer goodwill.  If allowed to go into 
effect, the Ordinance will force the Platforms to alter substantially their operations 
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to avoid steep criminal and civil penalties.  They will have to either monitor and 
remove listings (including potentially lawful ones) or redesign their sites to 
eliminate functions and features users want.  Supra at 11, 21.  This disruption to 
the Platforms’ businesses will irreparably damage their standing with their users.  
ER-395–96; ER-504–05.  This is precisely the kind of irreparable injury that 
warrants preliminary injunctive relief.  Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of Los 
Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1058 (9th Cir. 2009). 
Third, the potential violation of the Platforms’ free speech rights under the 
CDA and First Amendment constitutes irreparable harm.  The loss of such 
freedoms “unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.”  Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 
347, 373 (1976).  Moreover, the CDA is designed to protect websites not only from 
“ultimate liability” but also from “having to fight costly and protracted legal 
battles.”  Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1175.  If Santa Monica enforces the 
Ordinance before a decision on the merits, it will have succeeded in destroying 
CDA immunity. 
Fourth, the Platforms will suffer competitive harms because the Ordinance 
will not regulate at least some rivals (e.g., Craigslist).  “A rule putting plaintiffs at 
a competitive disadvantage constitutes irreparable harm.”  Int’l Franchise Ass’n, 
803 F.3d at 411. 
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V. THE BALANCE OF THE EQUITIES AND PUBLIC INTEREST 
FAVOR THE PLATFORMS 
The district court did not address the balance of the equities or public 
interest, but both factors sharply favor the Platforms.  They face deprivation of 
constitutional rights, criminal penalties, lost goodwill, and competitive 
disadvantage.  Klein v. City of San Clemente, 584 F.3d 1196, 1208 (9th Cir. 2009).  
“[I]t is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party’s 
constitutional rights,” Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012), 
and the public interest is served by “the Constitution’s declaration that federal law 
is to be supreme,” Am. Trucking, 559 F.3d at 1059–60.   
Santa Monica, on the other hand, cannot claim immediate harm sufficient to 
outweigh the Platforms’ injuries, nor is immediate enforcement in the public 
interest.  Even if Santa Monica cannot enforce the Ordinance against the Platforms, 
it can still enforce short-term rental laws against hosts who fail to register their 
properties, and undertake other efforts to improve compliance with its laws. 
CONCLUSION  
For these reasons, this Court should reverse the district court’s decision 
denying a preliminary injunction.  
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ADDENDUM
47 U.S.C. § 230.   
 
Protection for private blocking and screening of offensive material. 
 
(a) Findings 
 
The Congress finds the following: 
 
(1) The rapidly developing array of Internet and other interactive computer 
services available to individual Americans represent an extraordinary 
advance in the availability of educational and informational resources to our 
citizens. 
 
(2) These services offer users a great degree of control over the information 
that they receive, as well as the potential for even greater control in the 
future as technology develops. 
 
(3) The Internet and other interactive computer services offer a forum for a 
true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural 
development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity. 
 
(4) The Internet and other interactive computer services have flourished, to 
the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of government regulation. 
 
(5) Increasingly Americans are relying on interactive media for a variety of 
political, educational, cultural, and entertainment services. 
 
(b) Policy 
 
It is the policy of the United States— 
 
(1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and other 
interactive computer services and other interactive media; 
 
(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists 
for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by 
Federal or State regulation; 
 
(3) to encourage the development of technologies which maximize user 
control over what information is received by individuals, families, and 
schools who use the Internet and other interactive computer services; 
 
(4) to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking 
and filtering technologies that empower parents to restrict their children's 
access to objectionable or inappropriate online material; and 
 
(5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and 
punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of 
computer. 
 
(c) Protection for “Good Samaritan” blocking and screening of offensive 
material 
 
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker 
 
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the 
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information 
content provider. 
 
(2) Civil liability 
 
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on 
account of— 
 
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or 
availability of material that the provider or user considers to be 
obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or 
otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is 
constitutionally protected; or 
 
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information 
content providers or others the technical means to restrict access to 
material described in paragraph (1).1 
 
                                                 
1 So in original.  Likely should be “subparagraph (A).” 
(d) Obligations of interactive computer service 
 
A provider of interactive computer service shall, at the time of entering an 
agreement with a customer for the provision of interactive computer service and in 
a manner deemed appropriate by the provider, notify such customer that parental 
control protections (such as computer hardware, software, or filtering services) are 
commercially available that may assist the customer in limiting access to material 
that is harmful to minors. Such notice shall identify, or provide the customer with 
access to information identifying, current providers of such protections. 
 
(e) Effect on other laws 
 
(1) No effect on criminal law 
 
Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair the enforcement 
of section 223 or 231 of this title, chapter 71 (relating to obscenity) or 110 
(relating to sexual exploitation of children) of Title 18, or any other Federal 
criminal statute. 
 
(2) No effect on intellectual property law 
 
Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or expand any law 
pertaining to intellectual property. 
 
(3) State law 
 
Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent any State from 
enforcing any State law that is consistent with this section. No cause of 
action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or 
local law that is inconsistent with this section. 
 
(4) No effect on communications privacy law 
 
Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the application of the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 or any of the amendments 
made by such Act, or any similar State law. 
 
(5) No effect on sex trafficking law 
 
Nothing in this section (other than subsection (c)(2)(A)) shall be construed 
to impair or limit— 
 
(A) any claim in a civil action brought under section 1595 of title 18, 
United States Code, if the conduct underlying the claim constitutes a 
violation of section 1591 of that title; 
 
(B) any charge in a criminal prosecution brought under State law if 
the conduct underlying the charge would constitute a violation of 
section 1591 of title 18, United States Code; or 
 
(C) any charge in a criminal prosecution brought under State law if 
the conduct underlying the charge would constitute a violation of 
section 2421A of title 18, United States Code, and promotion or 
facilitation of prostitution is illegal in the jurisdiction where the 
defendant’s promotion or facilitation of prostitution was targeted. 
 
(f) Definitions 
 
As used in this section: 
 
(1) Internet 
 
The term “Internet” means the international computer network of both 
Federal and non-Federal interoperable packet switched data networks. 
 
(2) Interactive computer service 
 
The term “interactive computer service” means any information service, 
system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access 
by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or 
system that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or 
services offered by libraries or educational institutions. 
 
(3) Information content provider 
 
The term “information content provider” means any person or entity that is 
responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of 
information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer 
service. 
 
(4) Access software provider 
 
The term “access software provider” means a provider of software 
(including client or server software), or enabling tools that do any one or 
more of the following: 
 
(A) filter, screen, allow, or disallow content; 
 
(B) pick, choose, analyze, or digest content; or 
 
(C) transmit, receive, display, forward, cache, search, subset, 
organize, reorganize, or translate content. 
 
City Council Meeting: January 24, 2017 Santa Monica, California 
ORDINANCE NUMBER 253-b (CCS) 
(City Council Series) 
AN ORDINANCE OF THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF 
SANTA MONICA AMENDING AND REVISING CHAPTER 6.20 OF THE SANTA 
MONICA MUNICIPAL CODE REGULATING HOME-SHARING AND VACATION 
RENTALS 
WHEREAS, a central and significant goal for the City is preservation of its housing 
stock and preserving the quality and character of residential neighborhoods. Santa 
Monica places a high value on cohesive and active residential neighborhoods and the 
diverse population which resides therein. The City must preserve its available housing 
stock and the character and charm which result, in part, from cultural, ethnic, and 
economic diversity of its resident population as a key factor in economic growth; and 
WHEREAS, Santa Monica's natural beauty, its charming residential communities, 
its vibrant commercial quarters and its world class visitor serving amenities have drawn 
visitors from around the United States and around the world; and 
WHEREAS, there is within the City a diverse array of short term rentals for visitors, 
including, hotels, motels, bed and breakfasts, vacation rentals and home sharing, not all 
of which are lawful; and 
WHEREAS, operations of vacation rentals, where residents rent entire units to 
visitors and are not present during the visitors' stays, frequently disrupt the quietude and 
residential character of the neighborhoods and adversely impact the community; and 
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WHEREAS, on May 12, 2015, the City Council adopted Ordinance Number 2484 
which preserved the City's prohibition on vacation rentals, but authorized "home-sharing," 
whereby residents host visitors in their homes for short periods of stay, for compensation, 
while the resident host remains present throughout the visitors' stay; and 
WHEREAS, home-sharing does not create the same adverse impacts as 
unsupervised vacation rentals because, among other things, the resident hosts are 
present to introduce their guests to the City's neighborhoods and regulate their guests' 
behavior; and 
WHEREAS, while the City recognizes that home-sharing activities can be 
conducted in harmony with surrounding uses, those activities must be regulated to ensure 
that the small number of home-sharers stay in safe structures and do not threaten or harm 
the public health or welfare; and 
WHEREAS, any monetary compensation paid to the resident hosts for their 
hospitality and hosting efforts rightfully belong to such hosts and existing law authorizes 
the City to collect Transient Occupancy Taxes ("TOTs") for vacation rentals and home-
sharing activities; and 
WHEREAS, existing law obligates both the hosts and rental agencies or hosting 
platforms to collect and remit TOTs to the City; and 
WHEREAS, enforcement of the City's regulations on home-sharing, and 
prohibition on vacation rentals, can be extremely difficult without the cooperation of 
internet companies which facilitate both legal and illegal short term rentals; and 
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WHEREAS, to the fullest extent permitted by law, the City must be able to hold 
internet companies which profit from facilitating short-term rental transactions 
accountable for enabling illegal conduct; and 
WHEREAS, the City Council now wishes to clarify its regulations on short term 
rentals as they apply to hosting platforms which are internet companies that collect 
income by facilitating transactions between hosts and visitors in the short term rental 
marketplace; and 
WHEREAS, the City wishes to regulate the conduct of hosting platforms, but does 
not intend to regulate hosting platforms' publication or removal of content provided by 
third parties; and 
WHEREAS, the City does not intend to require hosting platforms to verify content 
provided by third parties or to ensure that short term rental hosts comply with the 
provisions of this Chapter. 
NOW, THEREFORE, THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF SANTA MONICA 
DOES HEREBY ORDAIN AS FOLLOWS: 
SECTION 1. Santa Monica Municipal Code Chapter 6.20 is hereby amended to 
read as follows: 
Chapter 6.20 HOME-SHARING AND VACATION RENTALS 
6.20.010 Definitions. 
For purposes of this Chapter, the following words or phrases shall have the following 
meanings: 
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(a) Home-Sharing. An activity whereby the residents host visitors in their homes, for 
compensation, for periods of thirty consecutive days or less, while at least one of the 
dwelling unit's primary residents lives on-site, in the dwelling unit, throughout the 
visitors' stay. (b) Host. Any person who is an owner, lessee, or sub-lessee of a 
residential property or unit offered for use as a vacation rental or home-share. Host also 
includes any person who offers, facilitates, or provides services to facilitate, a vacation 
rental or home-share, including but not limited to insurance, concierge services, 
catering, restaurant bookings, tours, guide services, entertainment, cleaning, property 
management, or maintenance of the residential property or unit regardless of whether 
the person is an owner, lessee, or sub-lessee of a residential property or unit offered for 
use as a vacation rental or home-share. Any person, other than an owner, lessee, or 
sub-lessee, who operates home-sharing or vacation rental activities exclusively on the 
Internet shall not be considered a Host. 
(c) Hosting Platform. A person who participates in the home-sharing or vacation 
rental business by collecting or receiving a fee, directly or indirectly through an agent or 
intermediary, for conducting a booking transaction using any medium of facilitation. 
(d) Booking Transaction. Any reservation or payment service provided by a person 
who facilitates a home-sharing or vacation rental transaction between a prospective 
transient user and a host. 
(e) Person. Any natural person, joint venture, joint stock company, partnership, 
association, club, company, corporation, business trust, or organization of any kind. 
(f) Vacation Rental. Rental of any dwelling unit, in whole or in part, within the City of 
Santa Monica, to any person(s) for exclusive transient use of thirty consecutive days or 
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less, whereby the unit is only approved for permanent residential occupancy and not 
approved for transient occupancy or home-sharing as authorized by this Chapter. 
Rental of units located within City approved hotels, motels and bed and breakfasts shall 
not be considered vacation rentals. 
6.20.020 Home-sharing authorization. 
(a) Notwithstanding any provision of this Code to the contrary, home-sharing shall 
be authorized in the City, provided that the host complies with each of the following 
requirements: 
(1) Obtains and maintains at all times a City business license authorizing home-
sharing activity. 
(2) Operates the home-sharing activity in compliance with all business license 
permit conditions, which may be imposed by the City to effectuate the purpose of this 
Chapter. 
(3) Collects and remits Transient Occupancy Tax ("TOT"), in coordination with any 
hosting platform if utilized, to the City and complies with all City TOT requirements as 
set forth in Chapter 6.68 of this Code. 
(4) Takes responsibility for and actively prevents any nuisance activities that may 
take place as a result of home-sharing activities. 
(5) Complies with all applicable laws, including all health, safety, building, fire 
protection, and rent control laws. 
(6) Complies with the regulations promulgated pursuant to this Chapter. 
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(b) All hosts and their respective properties, authorized by the City for home-sharing 
purposes pursuant to this Section, shall be listed on a registry created by the City and 
updated periodically by the City. The City shall publish the registry, and a copy shall be 
sent electronically to any person upon request. 
(c) If any provision of this Chapter conflicts with any provision of the Zoning Ordinance 
codified in Article IX of this Code, the terms of this Chapter shall prevail. 
6.20.030 Prohibitions. 
No host shall undertake, maintain, authorize, aid, facilitate or advertise any 
vacation rental activity or any home-sharing activity that does not comply with Section 
6.20.020 of this Code. 
6.20.050 Hosting platform responsibilities. 
(a) Hosting platforms shall be responsible for collecting all applicable TOTs and 
remitting the same to the City. The hosting platform shall be considered an agent of the 
host for purposes of TOT collections and remittance responsibilities as set forth in 
Chapter 6.68 of this Code. 
(b) Subject to applicable laws, Hosting platforms shall disclose to the City on a 
regular basis each home-sharing and vacation rental listing located in the City, the 
names of the persons responsible for each such listing, the address of each such listing, 
the length of stay for each such listing and the price paid for each stay. 
(c) Hosting platforms shall not complete any booking transaction for any residential 
property or unit unless it is listed on the City's registry created under section 6.20.020 
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subsection (b), at the time the hosting platform receives a fee for the booking 
transaction. 
(d) Hosting platforms shall not collect or receive a fee, directly or indirectly through 
an agent or intermediary, for facilitating or providing services ancillary to a vacation 
rental or unregistered home-share, including but not limited to insurance, concierge 
services, catering, restaurant bookings, tours, guide services, entertainment, cleaning, 
property management, or maintenance of the residential property or unit. 
(e) Safe Harbor: A Hosting Platform operating exclusively on the Internet, which 
operates in compliance with subsections (a), (b), (c), and (d) above, shall be presumed 
to be in compliance with this Chapter, except that the Hosting Platform remains 
responsible for compliance with the administrative subpoena provisions of this Chapter. 
(f) The provisions of this section shall be interpreted in accordance with otherwise 
applicable state and federal law(s) and will not apply if determined by the City to be in 
violation of, or preempted by, any such law(s). 
6.20.080 Regulations. 
The City Manager or his or her designee may promulgate regulations, which may 
include, but are not limited to, permit conditions, reporting requirements, inspection 
frequencies, enforcement procedures, advertising restrictions, disclosure requirements, 
administrative subpoena procedures or insurance requirements, to implement the 
provisions of this Chapter. No person shall fail to comply with any such regulation. 
6.20.090 Fees. 
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The City Council may establish and set by resolution all fees and charges as may be 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of this Chapter. 
6.20.100 Enforcement. 
(a) Any host violating any provision of this Chapter, or hosting platform that violates 
its obligations under section 6.20.050, shall be guilty of an infraction, which shall be 
punishable by a fine not exceeding two hundred fifty dollars, or a misdemeanor, which 
shall be punishable by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars, or by imprisonment in 
the County Jail for a period not exceeding six months or by both such fine and 
imprisonment. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating any provision of this Chapter in a criminal 
case or found to be in violation of this Chapter in a civil or administrative case brought 
by a law enforcement agency shall be ordered to reimburse the City and other 
participating law enforcement agencies their full investigative costs, pay all back TOTs, 
and remit all illegally obtained re.ntal revenue to the City so that it may be returned to the 
home-sharing visitors or used to compensate victims of illegal short term rental 
activities. 
(c) Any host who violates any provision of this Chapter, or hosting platform that 
violates its obligations under section 6.20.050, shall be subject to administrative fines 
and administrative penalties pursuant to Chapter 1.09 and Chapter 1.1 O of this Code. 
(d) Any interested person may seek an injunction or other relief to prevent or 
remedy violations of this Chapter. The prevailing party in such an action shall be entitled 
to recover reasonable costs and attorney's fees. 
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(e) The City may issue and serve administrative subpoenas as necessary to obtain 
specific information regarding home-sharing and vacation rental listings located in the 
City, including but not limited to, the names of the persons responsible for each such 
listing, the address of each such listing, the length of stay for each such listing and the 
price paid for each stay, to determine whether the home-sharing and vacation rental 
listings comply with this Chapter. Any subpoena issued pursuant to this section shall not 
require the production of information sooner than 30 days from the date of service. A 
person that has been served with an administrative subpoena may seek judicial review 
during that 30 day period. 
(f) The remedies provided in this Section are not exclusive, and nothing in this 
section shall preclude the use or application of any other remedies, penalties or 
procedures established by law. 
SECTION 2. Any provision of the Santa Monica Municipal Code or appendices 
thereto inconsistent with the provisions of this Ordinance, to the extent of such 
inconsistencies and no further, is hereby repealed or modified to that extent necessary 
to effect the provisions of this Ordinance. 
SECTION 3. If any section, subsection, sentence, clause, or phrase of this 
Ordinance is for any reason held to be invalid or unconstitutional by a decision of any 
court of competent jurisdiction, such decision shall not affect the validity of the 
remaining portions of this Ordinance. The City Council hereby declares that it would 
have passed this Ordinance and each and every section, subsection, sentence, clause, 
or phrase not declared invalid or unconstitutional without regard to whether any portion 
of the ordinance would be subsequently declared invalid or unconstitutional. 
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SECTION 4. The Mayor shall sign and the City Clerk shall attest to the passage 
of this Ordinance. The City Clerk shall cause the same to be published once in the 
official newspaper within 15 days after its adoption. This Ordinance shall become 
effective 30 days from its adoption. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
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Approved and adopted this 24th day of January, 2017. 
Ted Winterer, Mayor 
State of California ) 
County of Los Angeles ) ss. 
City of Santa Monica ) 
I, Denise Anderson-Warren, City Clerk of the City of Santa Monica, do 
hereby certify that the foregoing Ordinance No. 2535 (CCS) had its introduction 
on January 10, 2017, and was adopted at the Santa Monica City Council meeting 
held on January 24, 2017, by the following vote: 
AYES: Councilmembers McKeown, O'Connor, O'Day, Vazquez; 
Mayor Pro Tern Davis, Mayor Winterer 
NOES: None 
ABSENT: Councilmember Himmelrich 
ATTEST: 
2/):oj l'i 
Denise Anderson-Warren, City Clerk Date 
A summary of Ordinance No. 2535 (CCS) was duly published pursuant to 
California Government Code Section 40806. 
   
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 I hereby certify that on April 18, 2018, I electronically filed the foregoing 
document with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system. 
 I certify that all participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users and 
that service will be accomplished by the appellate CM/ECF system. 
 
       /s/ Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. 
April 18, 2018    Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. 
 
 
